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1.  INTRODUCTION 
One of  the primary purposes of  deregulating the Australian financial system 
in the 1980s was to make banking a competitive  industry.  The Campbell 
committee of  inquiry made this quite clear in its final report: 
"...the  committee  is  confident  that  with  the  adoption  of  its 
recommendations, a strongly competitive environment will in due 
course become firmly established and artificial market imperfections 
will be of  limited significance." (p. 532) 
There has been much recent debate about whether this purpose has in fact 
been achieved.  Milbourne and Currtberworth (1990) argue that entry barriers 
in branch banking may retard competition and hence lead to above-normal 
profits.  However, they find wholesale margins to have generally fallen since 
deregulation,  due possibly to increased competition from new domestic and 
foreign  banks.  Harper  (1991) argues  that  banks  still  enjoy  a  degree  of 
oligopoly power in the market for deposits.  Valentine (1990), on the other 
hand, argues that deregulation has made Australian banking competitive, as 
well as efficient in the technical sense. 
The evidence brought to bear by these studies is almost entirely descriptive. 
In contrast, we present econometric evidence on this question.  We  do so by 
estimating a monthly model of  conjectural variations for individual Australian 
banks, i.e. the reactions by each bank  to  the value of  loans made by other 
banks.  This model is estimated for owner-occupied housing loans, the only 
category for which the relevant data are available, over the period May 1986 
through  December  1990.  The  model  lets  us  test  three  hypotheses:  that 
Australian banking is competitive, collusive, or oligopolistic. 
Studies of  competition in banking  in other countries have been numerous. 
Recent studies of  Canadian banking include Nathan and Neave (1989) and Shaffer (1990). They find  evidence  in  favour of competition.  Studies by 
Evanoff  and Fortier (1988) and Shaffer (1989) find evidence of  competitive 
behaviour in US banking, while Berger and Hannan (1989) and Hannan and 
Liang (1991) find evidence that incumbent banks have market power.  Gilbert 
(1984) surveys the literature on market structure in the US banking industry. 
Studies which use a conjectural variations framework to estimate the degree 
of  competition in industries other than banking include Sullivan (1985), who 
investigates  the  cigarette industry  in  the  United  States,  and  Gollop  and 
Roberts (1979) who examine the coffee roasting industry, also in the United 
States. 
In Section 2 we describe the data that we use in this study, and present some 
elementary measures of  concentration. In Section 3 we motivate the use of  the 
conjectural variations framework.  Section 4 presents the results and Section 
5 concludes. 
2. DATA ISSUES 
All studies in applied industrial organisation face a common problem: how to 
define the industry under  consideration.  This is not as easy as it  seems. 
Banks are multi-product firms, which not only take deposits and make loans 
but deliver several other services, e.g. insurance, funds management, corporate 
advice, trading in foreign exchange markets, management of  property trusts, 
and no doubt many others.  Since banks compete, in part, not just  against 
each  other  but  against  merchant  banks,  insurance  companies  and  other 
providers of  financial services, a case can be made for examining competition 
not just  between  banks but in the financial services industry as a whole. 
However, this is impractical because the necessary data do not exist.' 
Data  on  lending  by  individual  banks  are  available  on  reporting  forms 
submitted by each bank to  the Reserve Bank.  These forms contain certain 
disaggregated data on the bank's assets and liabilities.  This is potentially 
useful  information because recent discussions of  Australian banking have 
' One could also argue that banks compete against building societies in the market for 
home loans.  However, this issue is difficult to deal with in practice because many building 
societies became banks during our sample period. asserted that "retail" banking is less competitive than "wholesale" banking, the 
former  being  done  primarily  at  bank  branches,  the  presence  of  which 
constitute an (alleged) barrier to entry.  Retail banking is essentially lending 
for housing plus personal loans.  However, reliable data on the latter have 
been available only since January 1989.  We  therefore use the housing loan 
market as a proxy for retail banking and construct a monthly series of housing 
loans by individual banks.  To obtain a measure of the real value of loans, we 
deflate these data by a housing price series.  The Appendix contains details 
of data sources and construction. 
Most  analyses of  competition start with  some measures of concentration. 
Figure 1 plots the concentration  of  Australian banking  assets as measured 
by the Herfindahl index.  This index is defined as 
where si is the share of  each bank in the market.  H=O is the limiting case of 
an infinite number of  firms with zero share of  the market, while H=I when 
there is a monopoly.  l]H gives the number for "equal sized firm equivalence", 
so that, for example, H=0.25 is equivalent to the existence of  four banks of 
equal size. 
Figure 1  shows that the concentration ratio has had its ups and downs since 
the early 1980s. The big rise in 1982/83 was assodated with the merger of  the 
Bank of  New South Wales with the Commercial Bank of  Australia in October 
1982 to form Westpac Banking Corporation, and the merger of  the National 
Bank  of Australasia wit11  the Commercial Banking Company of Sydney in 
January 1983 to form the National Australia Bank.  The introduction of  new 
banks - both foreign and converted building societies and merchant banks - 
in the mid 1980s led to a decline in concentration.  The recent takeover of  the 
State Bank of Victoria by the Commonwealth Bank in January 1991 has led to 
an increase in concentration. 
Figure 2 plots the concentration of  housing lending over sample period May 
1986 to  December  1990.  This  is  the period  of  the deregulated market  for 
housing loans that we use in the estimation of  our model.  As Figure 2 shows, 
concentration in loans for  housing gradually diminished over the period. me relatively large fall in March 1987 was due to the United Permanent Building 
Society becoming National  Mutual Royal Bank.)  Figure 2 also shows the 
relative unimportance of  foreign banks in the market for housing loans.  The 
average value for H is 0.14. 
3. THE CONJECTURAL VARIATIONS MODEL 
Figure 2 presents a prima facie  case that the housing market is only  reasonably 
competitive,  with  the  equivalent  of  only  seven  equal sized  banks  in  the 
market.  However,  conventional  measures  of  concentration,  such  as  the 
Herfindahl index, are flawed as indicators of  competition because they take 
no  account  of  the  behaviour  of  the  firms  (banks  in  our  case)  under 
consideration.  Substantial competition can exist in industries with only a few 
competitors, e.g. the Australian airline industry appears to be very competitive 
(at present), with only two firms.  On the other hand, Ausubel (1991) finds 
huge monopoly profits in the United States credit card industry, where there 
are over 4000 firms! 
This point has been well-known for many years to economists working in 
applied industrial organisation, but it seems to have escaped the notice of 
many participants in the current debate on the state of  Australian banking. 
The conjectural variations approach (introduced by Bowley 1924) takes into 
account  the  behaviour  of  firms  in  estimating  the  degree  of  non- 
competitiveness in an industry. 
Specifically, consider an n firm industry where each firm chooses its output 
qi to maximize its profits n, defined as revenues less costs, 
Max n=P(Q)q.-C.(q.)  I  It 
qi 
where P is the industry price (charged by all firms) and Q is industry output. 
The first order conditions for this problem are where dCi/dqi is the marginal cost of  the i'th  firm. 
Note that 
and that 
Thus the quantity produced by firm i, qi, affects total production in the market 
directly and indirectly through its effect on the price, P. 
The first order conditions can be re-written as 
Define 
This is the sum of  the reactions of  all of  the other firms in the market to a 
change in the quantity produced by firm i, as perceived by that firm.  With 
banks,  the  relevant  quantity  is  the  real  value  of  loans  in  any  specified 
period.2 
A limitation of  our approach is that the conjectural variations framework assumes that 
firms compete by varying quantities.  In the case of  housing loans by banks  other forms 
of competition may also be relevant.  Although data for housing loan rates do not appear 
to vary greatly between banks, they might still compete on price, e.g.  by offering lower 
rates to new borrowers (for a limited time) or by  competing on fees.  They also compete, 
to an extent, by offering different products, e.g. fixed versus floating rate mortgages. Several interesting special cases can be derived: 
(i)  ai = -1, for all firms.  In this case, each firm sets price equal to marginal 
cost, i.e. perfect competition prevails in the industry. Each firm perceives that 
any increase in its output will be  exactly offset by its competitors, so that 
industry output (and therefore price) is exogenous to each firm. 
(ii) ai = -1 + l/s9 where si is the market share of  the i'th  firm.  Here, the 
reactions are such that each firm tries to maintain a stable market share.  This 
is the case of  perfect collusion, or a cartel between the firms.  In this case, 
there  is  effectively just  one  firm in  the  industry,  which  acts as a  profit- 
maximising monopolist.  Substitution of  ai  = -1 + l/Si into (6) yields 
This is the profit maximising condition for a monopolist, i.e. marginal revenue 
(which is greater than price) equal to marginal cost. 
(iii) ai  = 0.  In this case, each firm conjectures that its competitors will not (in 
aggregate) respond to any change in its output. This is the case of  a Cournot 
oligopoly. 
Of  course, in empirical applications, none of  these special cases is likely to 
arise exactly.  The degree of  competition can be  measured by the adjusted 
Herfindahl index: 
Thus, both the degree of  concentration and behaviour determine the measure 
of  competition in the industry.  When there is perfect competition (ai  = -1, for 
all i), then fi = 0,  regardless of  the degree of  concentration.  In the case of 
perfect collusion (ai  = -l+l/si, for all i), then fi = 1, again regardless of  the 
degree of  concentration.  Only in  the case of  Cournot oligopoly (ai  = 0,  for 
all i) do the unadjusted and adjusted Herfindahl indices coincide. 
The econometric problem is to estimate the parameters ai. However, some 
specification issues need to be resolved before estimation can proceed.  That is, there are factors other than conjectural variations influence the amount of 
lending done by banks.  The most obvious of  these are the return on the loan 
and the cost of  funds, for which we use the relevant housing loan interest 
rate, and the 90 day bank accepted bill rate, respectively.  These interest rates 
are lagged one period.  We also include a constant, eleven seasonal dummy 
variables and a dummy for the new reporting forms introduced in January 
1989.  An additional dummy is introduced to account for ANZ's takeover of 
National Mutual Royal Bank in April 1990. 
The theory is also entirely static3 In practice, however, the response of  banks 
to changes in lending by other banks need not occur in the same period.  We 
specify  our  model  so  that  banks  respond  to  the  loans  made  by  their 
competitors in the previous period (month, in  this case). 
Obviously, we cannot include every bank, no matter how small, in the model, 
so we exclude all banks with a market share of  less than ten per cent.  This 
leaves us with five banks in the housing loan market: the Commonwealth 
(CBA), Westpac (WBC), National Australia Bank (NAB), ANZ, and State Bank 
of  Victoria  (SBV).  Furthermore,  since  we  are  not  estimating a  demand 
function, the housing interest rate is exogenous in this model.4  This means 
that, given the interest rate, the total value of  loans is pre-determined.  To 
take account of  this, we introduce a "residual bank" (RES), which is defined 
as the total market less the five banks above. 
The  housing  model  to  be  estimated  is  set  out in  equations  10-15.  The 
subscripts 1...6  refer to CBA, WBC, NAB, ANZ, SBV  and RES  respectively. 
Thus, ql  is the value of  housing loans made by the Commonwealth Bank in 
I 
period t, qZ,t-l  refers to loans made by Westpac in the previous period etc. 
The coefficients of  main interest are the P.., ifj. 
11 
3  There are many dynamic models of  oligopoly in the industrial organisation literature; 
see Shapiro (1989) for a survey.  Thus far, however, their testable implications have not 
been well developed. 
We use each bank's own interest rates for housing in their respective equations, except 
for SBV and RES, for which we use the CBA rate.  In practice, there is very little variation 
in housing interest rates across banks at any point in time. The  test  for competition is  that  the  following restrictions  on the model's 
coefficients jointly hold: 
To test for collusion, -1 is replaced by -1 + l/si (i=1  ...  6),  where sl..,s6 are the 
shares of  each  of  the  six banks  in the  sample.  In  the  test  for  Cournot 
oligopoly the restrictions are that the coefficients sum to zero.  These tests 
involve cross equation restrictions, so we use a systems estimator, iterative 
seemingly unrelated regressions, to estimate the model. 
4. RESULTS 
The parameter estimates for three models are presented in Tables l(a) and 
l(b). In one sense, the results are rather unsatisfactory, with only about one- 
third of  the estimated parameters signifcantly different from zero.  However, 
since we do not wish to place any emphasis on the reactions of  any particular 
banks, the individual parameter estimates are of  limited interest; rather it is 
the aggregate variations which are of  interest. The estimates in Table l(b) are 
disappointing in that most of  the estimates on the interest rates are wrongly 
signed or insignificant.  Our guess is that there is a lot of  noise in the monthly 
data that is not  captured by our specification.  Possibly, a more elaborate 
supply function needs to be estimated to  capture the variation in monthly 
lending. 
The aggregate variations are the ai  reported in the last column of  Table l(a). 
These are found by summing the  Pi in the relevant  column. Thus, the ai 
corresponding to the CBA is equal to -0.88, found by summing the coeffiaents 
in the column headed  Pile  In every case the point estimate of  ai  is much 
closer to -1 (corresponding to perfect competition) than it is to -l+l/si (perfect Table l(a): Conjectural Variation Parameters 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) Table l(b): Other Parameters 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
I=CBA, 2=WBC, 3=ANZ, 4=NAB, 5=SBV, 6=RES 
Coefficients on dummy variables not reported. 14 
Table 2:  Tests for Competition, Collusion and Cournot Oligopoly 
* sigruhcance levels at which null hypothesis is rejected. 
# 1.=CBA,  2=WBC, 3=ANZ, &NAB,  5=SBV, 6=ES 
sI=O.23, s2=0.18, s3=0.11, s4=0.12, s5=O.I3, ~~z0.23 
Test 
Competition: 
ai  = -1, i=1  ...  6 
collusion).  Nevertheless, in every case (except for the CBA), the departure 
from perfect competition appears to be significant. 
Test Statistic 
47.81 
This hypothesis is confirmed by the results of  the formal tests for competition, 






ai=  -l+l/Si, i=1  ...  6 
where T is the number of  observations, while  I Z,I  and 1 Z,  1  are, respectively, 
the determinants of  the covariance matrices of  the errors in the restricted and 
unrestricted systems.  The test statistics are distributed as Chi-squared, with 
degrees of  freedom equal to six, the number of restrictions.  The results of the 
tests  are  such  that  we  can  decisively  reject  the  hypothesis  of  perfect 
competition, and even more decisively, perfect collusion  in the market for 
housing loans.  However, we  are unable to reject the hypothesis that  this 
market can be characterised as a Cournot oligopoly. 
- 
Cournot Oligopoly: 
ai=  0,  i=1  ...  6 
3.65  0.72 In  interpreting  these  results,  we  note  that  the  standard  errors  on  the 
conjectural variation  parameters are relatively large.  Thus, our inability to 
reject the hypothesis of  a Cournot oligopoly might be due to the imprecision 
of  our  parameter  estimates.  However,  this  imprecision  strengthens  our 
rejections of  perfect competition and perfect collusion, since large standard 
errors reduce the likelihood that any hypothesis will be rejected. 
Finally, we report calculations of  both unad.justed and adjusted Herfindahl 
indices of  concentration, where the market is defined as in the model (the five 
largest banks plus one residual bank).  The unadjusted index is 0.18,  while 
the adjusted iridex is 0.1 1. Thus the housing loan market can be characterised 
as containing about nine banks of  equal size, and so appears to be reasonably 
competitive, but not perfectly so. 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
We have estimated a conjectural variations model  of  bank lending for  the 
owner-occupied  housing  market.  We  are  able  to  decisively  reject  the 
hypothesis that this market is perfectly competitive, as well as the hypothesis 
that banks collude to form a cartel.  We are unable to reject the hypothesis 
that  the  market  for  housing  loans  is  a  Cournot  oligopoly, although  this 
conclusion could be plausibly challenged on statistical grounds. 
Of  course, we do not view this paper as the final word on this subject.  The 
imprecision of  the parameter estimates on the interest rates indicate to us that 
more sophisticated supply functions ought to be estimated, as well as perhaps 
giving greater emphasis to dynamic specifications.  Furthermore, banks may 
well compete in ways we have not modelled, e.g. by price competition, and 
this needs  to  be  accounted for in  a complete study of  competition in this 
market. 
Finally, we note that the degree of  competition in any market is determined 
endogenously.  If  the  market  for  housing  loans  is  not  competitive,  the 
interesting issue  for  policy  is  to  determine why  this  is  the  case.  Future 
research needs to examine issues such as barriers to entry, transactions costs 
and consumer inertia as impediments to the existence of  competitive markets. APPENDIX: DATA SOURCES 
(a) Housing Lending 
To  construct  data  from  May  1986  to  December  1990,  three  consecutive 
reporting forms  were  used.  All  three  forms  are  a  statement  of  banks' 
liabilities and assets within Australia.  Prior to 1989, trading banks submitted 
a weekly  reporting form with categories different to those of  the monthly 
savings bank reporting form.  In January 1989, a new reporting form was 
introduced, which contained more detailed categories of  deposit and lending 
activities. The categories were standardised for trading and savings banks, and 
they both reported weekly. A third reporting form was introduced in January 
1990, but apart from removing the distinction between trading and savings 
banks, only minor modifications were made. 
All  housing  lending  prior  to  January 1989 was  taken  from  the  housing 
category in  the  savings bank reporting form.  The  pre-1989 trading bank 
reporting forms did not have a category  for housing lending, and is  thus 
assumed to be zero. The post-1989 reporting forms showed the amount of 
total trading bank housing lending was roughly $2.2 billion in January 1989, 
or about 4 per cent of  bank housing.  Further details can be found in  the 
Reserve Bank of  Australia (RBA) Bulletin, Table B.4, "Lending to Persons", or 
Table 8.14, "Assets - Individual Banks".  Previously,  trading bank housing 
lending  was  classified  as  "Other  Lending",  and  categorised  as  "Mainly 
Business" in RBA Bulletin Table D.4, "Credit to the Private Sector by Financial 
Intermediaries". 
The post-January 1989 reporting form for trading banks and savings banks 
contain a more detailed breakdown of the category of  housing finance for 
owner occupation; into secured and unsecured lending.  We sum these iterns 
to provide a consistent series with the pre-1989 reporting forms.  Idowever, 
some  savings  banks  housing  loans  were  reclassified  mainly  into  other 
personal, but no information on the size of  this transfer is available. 
One trading bank bought the housing loan portfolio of  the Defence Services 
Home Corporation in January 1989.  It was added to the bank's books over 
a period of months.  No adjustments were made to this bank's housing series. The latest reporting fonn, introduced in January 1990, removed the distinction 
between trading and savings banks, and included a new category; non-owner 
occupied housing finance. This item includes investment lending for housing 
to persons and business; see RBA  Bulletin Table B.4,  footnote (b).  This item 
has been excluded from the housing series used in our study, but may have 
been partly included in the pre-1989 savings bank reporting form category of 
housing, and partly as "Other Lending".  No information on the size of  the 
reclassification is available, but in January 1990, the category was $8.5 bdlion 
or 14.1 per cent of  housing lending. This category is not included in housing 
lending in Table B.14,  and thus the housing lending series of  our study is 
consistent with Table B.14, "Housing". 
(Note that the numbers of  the RBA Bulletin Tables quoted above refer to the 
December 1990 issue but may vary from issue to issue.) 
(b) Other Variables 
The  90-day  bank  accepted  bill  rate  is  from  the  RBA  Bulletin, Table  F.l, 
"Interest Rates and Yields: Money Market". 
Individual bank interest rates for new housing loans to individuals for owner 
occupation are from internal RBA  sources. 
Housing prices are from the Real Estate Institute of  Australia, Market Facts, 
various issues.  Housing prices are a weighted average of  the following cities: 
Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide, Perth and Canberra.  Weights are calculated 
from "Housing Finance for Owner Occupation, Australia", ABS Cat. No. 5609, 
on the basis of  each city's  share of  total housing finance. (C)  The Banks in This Study 
The major banks in the housing market are as follows: 
The Commonwealth Bank of  Australia, including 
- Commonwealth Savings Bank 
- Commonwealth Development Bank 
The merger with the State Bank of  Victoria occurred in January 1991. 
ANZ Banking Group, including 
- ANZ Savings Bank 
- National Mutual Royal Bank, and 
- National Mutual Royal Savings Bank 
The National Mutual Royal Bank was acquired by the ANZ in April 1990. 
National Australia Bank, including 
- National Australia Savings Bank 
- Australian Resources Development Bank 
The Australian Resources Development Bank was acquired by  the National 
Australia Bank in October 1989. 
State Bank of  Victoria, including 
- Australian Bank, acquired in February 1989 
Westpac Banking Corporation, including 
- Westpac Savings Bank 
The  Commonwealth  Development  Bank  and  the  Australian  Resources 
Development Bank are specialist banks that did not record housing lending. 
The Australian Bank did record some housing lending on the new reporting 
forms but not prior to January 1989.  Subsequent Australian Bank  housing 
lending  was  transferred  to  the  books  of  the State  Bank  of  Victoria.  A 
complete list of  all banks as at December 1990 can be found in Table B.14, 
RBA  Bulletin, February 1991. 19 
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